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Monogamy appears to have become the predominant human mating system
with the emergence of highly unequal agricultural populations that replaced
relatively egalitarian horticultural populations, challenging the conventional
idea—based on the polygyny threshold model—that polygyny should
be positively associated with wealth inequality. To address this polygyny
paradox, we generalize the standard polygyny threshold model to a mutual
mate choice model predicting the fraction of women married polygynously.
We then demonstrate two conditions that are jointly sufficient to make mon-
ogamy the predominant marriage form, even in highly unequal societies.
We assess if these conditions are satisfied using individual-level data from
29 human populations. Our analysis shows that with the shift to stratified
agricultural economies: (i) the population frequency of relatively poor
individuals increased, increasing wealth inequality, but decreasing the
frequency of individuals with sufficient wealth to secure polygynous
& 2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
marriage, and (ii) diminishing marginal fitness returns to
additional wives prevent extremely wealthy men from
obtaining as many wives as their relative wealth would
otherwise predict. These conditions jointly lead to a high
population-level frequency of monogamy.
1. Introduction
Decades of both theoretical [1–4] and empirical research [5–9]
based on the polygyny threshold model [1,2] have suggested
that polygyny should be more common and more pronounced
in populations in which males differ substantially in resource
control. In humans, this will be in socio-cultural contexts
where wealth is held predominately by men, and where
there is high inequality in its distribution. Historical and
cross-cultural records, however, suggest that polygyny
became less common as relatively egalitarian horticultural pro-
duction systems (land-abundant, labour-limited cultivation)
transitioned into agricultural production systems (land-limited
cultivation, often coupled with stratified social systems)
[10,11], in spite of the fact that agriculture is characterized by
both a greater importance of material wealth in the production
process and greater levels of material wealth inequality than
horticulture [12–15]. This is the polygyny paradox.
Existing hypotheses for the rise of monogamy with
historic agricultural populations invoke the increasing impor-
tance of rival1 material wealth among agriculturalists [17],
inheritance rules in conjunction with paternity certainty [4],
male power relations [18], declines in female contributions to
production [19,20], pathogen risk and punishment [21,22]
and cultural group selection via the imposition of norms
[23,24]. Since human behavioural variation is often deter-
mined by many underlying factors, there are likely to be
complementary effects among the potential causes identified
in these hypotheses.
Specifically, there should be coevolutionary interactions
between the individual-level, economic- and fitness-based
explanations for the rise of monogamy advanced here, and
the cultural evolutionary explanations provided by Henrich
et al. [24] and Bauch & McElreath [22]. Our results show
how individual fitness maximization can explain the de novo
origins of predominant monogamy within highly unequal
populations. Should monogamy have group-level fitness
benefits as suggested by Henrich et al. [24], its emergence
in specific groups via the mechanism we propose would pro-
vide the source populations for cultural group selection [25]
dynamics to propagate monogamy to other populations.
Explanations for the rise of monogamy in agricultural
societies in the spirit of Alexander [23] and Henrich et al. [24]
develop the idea that powerful leaders might have imposed
monogamy on the masses because such a marriage norm
leads to greater in-group male–male cooperation, improving
the success of the group in inter-group contests (including war-
fare) [26]. The economically grounded explanation for the rise of
monogamy that we present here is not necessarily in compe-
tition with such theories. Our model, however, establishes that
basic changes in the structuring of wealth inequality coinciding
with the rise of class-based societies would have made mon-
ogamy adaptive at the individual level in a large fraction of
the population—greatly increasing the scope for hypotheses
advancing hierarchical imposition or even frequency dependent
social transmission of norms for monogamy.
The present analysis builds on work recognizing the
importance of inherited wealth in structuring family relation-
ships [4,17,27]. To this existing literature, we introduce a
new individual-level, cross-cultural dataset of wealth, mar-
riage and reproductive outcomes, numbering 11 813 records
from 29 human populations, including hunter–gathers,
horticulturalists, agropastoralists and agriculturalists. Our
dataset is unusual in both its scope and in the availability of
individual-level information, rather than qualitative societal
summaries. While not without its limitations—discussed in
more detail throughout—it captures the core features of the
polygyny paradox.
Following Oh et al. [17], we develop a model of the equi-
librium fraction of women married polygynously in a
population where the extent of polygyny is determined by
the fitness maximizing choices of both men and women. In
contrast to the standard polygyny threshold model [1,2],
which is a one-sided mate choice model that allows only for
female choice, we develop a mutual or two-sided model [28].
In this model, male choice refers not to selecting particular
females on the basis of their quality (females are identical
in our model), but rather to the male’s choice of the
number of wives that will maximize his fitness. A male’s
demand for wives depends on his level of wealth and the
costs of mating investment, and can be more than, less than
or equal to the total number of women who would choose
to marry him. Mutual mate choice is rare in nature, but the
conditions for it are met in species in which biparental care
is important for the survival of offspring, as is typically
true of humans [29].
From our theoretical model, we identify two conditions
that jointly can lead to a decrease in the population-level
frequency of polygyny in highly unequal agricultural popu-
lations: (i) in these highly stratified economies, the fraction
of men with sufficient wealth to make polygynous marriage
an attractive option for them and their potential partners is
low relative to other subsistence systems, and (ii) decreasing
marginal fitness returns to increasing number of wives
above and beyond the fitness costs of sharing a husband’s
wealth sharply limit the number of wives acquired by
exceptionally wealthy individuals. We use our empirical
data to demonstrate that the transition to agriculture is
associated with both of these factors identified as drivers
of monogamy.
1.1. The polygyny paradox
The Standard Cross-Cultural Sample [30] illustrates that the
frequency of polygyny is relatively high in horticultural and
pastoral populations, and low in agricultural populations.
These findings are robust to use of quantitative (figure 1a) or
qualitative (figure 1b) descriptors of polygyny. The third
panel (figure 1c) presents our estimates of the extent of
material wealth inequality among males in the four
production systems.
Theoretical models of mating systems [1–4,31] predict that
polygyny should be positively associated with inequality in
male resources, and more specifically with what Murdock
[32, pp. 206–207] terms ‘movable property or wealth which
can be accumulated in quantity by men’. These forms of
rival material wealth are, as we have just seen, more unequally
held in horticultural economies than among foragers, which is
consistent with the greater extent of polygyny in the former.
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Oh et al. [17] show that inequality in reproductively important,
non-rival forms of wealth—network ties, genes conferring
adaptive phenotypes or acquired knowledge, for example—
can also be a strong driver of polygyny, contributing to
the explanation of substantial levels of polygyny in some
societies with little rival wealth inequality. Indeed, there is
empirical evidence that non-rival forms of wealth are associ-
ated with polygynyous marriage in some foraging [33,34]
and horticultural [35] populations.
While the polygyny threshold model has been effective
in predicting the distribution of polygynous males within
populations (e.g. [6,17]), the reduced level of polygyny in
agricultural populations typically characterized by greater
inequality poses a serious challenge to existing models of
mating and marriage.
1.2. A comparative dataset
To address this challenge, we build a comparative database
of individual-level wealth, marriage and reproductive
success measures in 29 diverse populations distributed over
a wide geographical range (figure 2). Table 1 provides
population-specific background data.
In order to use all cohorts of the adult male populations,
relevant measures—wives and wealth proxies—are age
adjusted in a Bayesian framework to represent their
predicted values at age 60. This method of age adjustment
assumes that the additional acquisition of wives and wealth
from the time of censor to the age of 60 are unmeasured posi-
tive random variables, with mean values governed by the
remaining time for acquisition and the age-specific acqui-
sition rate trajectories inferred from the population cross
sections (see the electronic supplementary materials for
mathematical details).
Our polygyny measures reflect the per cent of women
who will ever be married to a man who marries more than
once—in other words, in contrast to the data in figure 1a,
we consider sequential marriage as a form of polygyny
since the offspring of each mother are rival claimants to a
father’s property. Our age adjustment delivers a measure
that could be called ‘completed polygyny’ by analogy to
‘completed fertility’. The populations exhibiting surprisingly
high levels of polygyny by our definition—e.g. the Ache´,
Hadza, Maya, English and Krummho¨rn populations—reflect
the prevalence of serial monogamy, not polygyny in the
usual sense of multiple concurrent wives. Although most
anthropological analyses of polygyny limit the definition of
the term to two or more co-occuring wives of one man, we
forego the sequential/concurrent distinction because (i) a
male’s wealth is generally shared to some degree across all
wives and the children of each over the male’s lifetime and
(ii) as we show later, the elasticities2 of fitness with respect
to times married are reliably positive for almost all popu-
lations sampled here, even those in which serial monogamy
is practised. This suggests that males do indeed increase
fitness through marriage to multiple women, even in cases
in which these marriages are sequential.
Sequential marriage can be considered a form of poly-
gyny insofar as men typically replace divorced wives with
younger women, allowing a subset of males in the popu-
lation to increase their lifetime reproductive success relative
to less wealthy males in the population, as has been shown
in many of the populations sampled here (e.g. [62–64]) and
elsewhere, both directly [65] and indirectly [66]. The essential
puzzle to be explained with our model, however, is not the
extent to which effective polygyny is driven by concurrent
marriage versus sequential remarriage, but rather how effec-
tive polygyny (i.e. inequality in wife-years and the resultant
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Figure 1. (a) Mean frequency of married women who are married polygynously by production system (+2 s.e.) using the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample [30].
Rates of polygyny are measured with variable ]872, per cent of wives with co-wives. (b) Rates of monogamy and polygyny by production system are measured with
variable ]861, the standard polygamy code. Data on subsistence come from variable ]858, categorized subsistence. In general, agricultural populations show reduced
rates of polygyny and increased rates of monogamy relative to other subsistence systems. See electronic supplementary material for more information. (c) Gini of
wealth by production system in our sample.
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inequality in reproduction) can be attenuated by changes in
the structuring of wealth inequality.
As in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample [30], there is no
overall relationship between wealth inequality as measured
by the Gini coefficient and per cent age-adjusted female poly-
gyny in our sample (figure 3). However, analysed by
subsistence category, this relationship varies. Foragers show
little variation in wealth inequality, but high variation in
polygyny. Agricultural populations show high variation
in inequality, but low and relatively invariant levels of
polygyny. Among horticultural—b ¼ 2.02 (90%CI: 0.65,
3.39)—and agropastoral—b ¼ 0.86 (90%CI: 0.49, 1.24)—
populations, we find the expected positive associations
between wealth inequality as measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient and per cent female polygyny. A possible concern
related to the cross-cultural compatibility of our estimates is
that our rival wealth proxies vary between populations and
productions systems; in cross-cultural projects as wide-ran-
ging as this one, however, there is rarely a single variable
that can be compared directly across populations—instead,
we have relied on ethnographic accounts to identify which
sources of wealth are most relevant to production and repro-
duction in each society, and attempted to build a cross-
culturally comparable dataset by using the most locally
relevant measures of wealth in each population (see
electronic supplementary material for further discussion).
1.3. A mutual mate choice model of polygyny and
its decline
Following Oh et al. [17], we consider a population of men with
two types of fitness-relevant resources [67]: non-rival wealth,
denoted as g, and rival wealth, denoted asm. As a useful mne-
monic, we can think of g as the value of a male’s genetic
contribution to offspring production and survival, and m as
the value of his material contributions, but the general defi-
nitions are considerably broader. Although we treat g and m
as completely distinct stores of wealth in this mathematical
model, we recognize that most empirical wealth variables
will lie somewhere on a continuum of rivalness between
non-rival resources, like genes, that can be provided to all off-
spring in equal measure, and rival resources, like land, which
must be divided among offspring. For example, local ecologi-
cal knowledge can be passed in equal measure to all offspring,
but the time allocated to personal instruction may be rival. We
represent the total mating investment devoted to acquiring a
wife by a cost equal to c units of the rival resource per wife;
this term includes classic costs, such as bride price, in addition
to all other costs associated with courtship and marriage. For
an explanation of these and all other variables and functions
used in this paper, see table 2.
If a man marries n women, the non-rival wealth available
to each wife is g and the rival wealth available to each wife is
(m 2 cn)/n. As in Oh et al.’s [17] model, we assume that each
wife produces offspring as a function of the wealth she has
been provided by the male, adjusted for the importance—g
and m—of each type of wealth to fitness. The fitness, w, of
a male is then given by the effective number of wives
acquired by the male multiplied by their average fitness:
w ¼ nd|{z}
effective
number
of wives
: gg
m nc
n
 m
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
average fitness
per effective wife
¼ ggðm cnÞmndm: ð1:1Þ
The parameters g and m are constrained to the unit interval
reflecting the assumption—strongly confirmed in our empiri-
cal estimates—that the marginal fitness effect of additional
wealth of either type, while positive, is either constant or
diminishing as wealth increases. Note that rival and non-
rival wealth are modelled as complementary inputs using a
fitness function analogous to the Cobb–Douglas function
widely used in economics. This assumption formalizes the
idea that having high non-rival wealth (like farming skill)
with limited material wealth (like land, seed and farming
tools) will not contribute as much to fitness as having farm-
ing skill in the presence of substantial amounts of such
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Figure 2. Locations of populations studied in this investigation (see table 1 for details).
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material resources. In other words, the multiplicative nature
of the fitness function means that the marginal fitness effect
of each kind of wealth is greater as the amount of the other
kind of wealth increases.
The parameter d is key to our proposed resolution of
the polygyny paradox. It controls the extent of diminishing
returns to increasing number of wives for reasons unrelated
to the need to share a male’s rival wealth among wives; a
value of one indicates no such sources of diminishing
returns and an increasing extent of such diminishing returns
is indicated by values of d falling farther below one. In
the model, as d decreases the effective number of wives falls
further below the empirically observed number n, indicating
that female reproduction is constrained in some way by a
male’s additional marriages for reasons other than rival
wealth sharing.
In order to produce analytically tractable results, we
simplify by assuming throughout that there are only two
types of males, rich and poor, with rich males being a fraction
u of the population. All rich are identical, as are all poor. The
rich males are indexed by r and the poor by p. We also assume
that females hold no wealth and are identical in their repro-
ductive potential. Neither of these assumptions is essential to
the model or its behaviour, and both can be relaxed via
computational methods (e.g. as presented in Oh et al. [17]).
In the analysis that follows, females will maximize their
reproductive success by becoming the nth wife of a rich
male so long as the following condition—our generalized
Table 1. Location, subsistence, marriage system and rival wealth proxies used in analysis of wealth inequality in 29 populations. Citations provide background
information on the specified population. We acknowledge that most empirical wealth variables will lie somewhere on a continuum of rivalness, but we have
attempted to choose variables that are more rival than non-rival for use in this empirical study. For more details on rival wealth and its comparability across
sites, see the electronic supplementary materials. Note also, that we use the term Mixed to describe the mating system when concurrent marriage is socially
accepted and practised alongside monogamy, but at lower intensity than is observed in more classical systems of polygyny—e.g. as among African
agropastoralists. In groups with a mixed mating system, neither monogamy nor polygyny constitutes the sole form of marriage that is culturally obtainable or
aspired towards. The sample size of males in each population is denoted by N.
ID population citation location subsistence marriage system rival wealth proxy N
1 Ache´ [36] Paraguay foraging mixed weight 117
2 Agta [37] Philippines foraging monogamy weight 90
3 Aka [38] C.A.R. foraging mixed weight 89
4 Dolgan/Niaa [39] Siberia foraging monogamy territory, vehicles 308
5 Hadza [40] Tanzania foraging mixed weight 100
6 !Kung [41] Botswana foraging monogamy weight 81
7 Lamalera [42] Indonesia foraging monogamy weight 238
8 Pume´ [43] Venezuela foraging mixed weight 46
9 Chagga [44] Tanzania horticulture monogamy cows, land 49
10 Makushi [45] Guyana horticulture mixed land 145
11 Matsigenka [46] Peru horticulture mixed boats 37
12 Maya [1] [47] Belize horticulture monogamy land 39
13 Maya [2] [48] Mexico horticulture monogamy land, vehicles 85
14 Mayangna/Miskito [49] Nicaragua horticulture mixed wealth 47
15 Pimbwe [50] Tanzania horticulture mixed cows, land 231
16 Tsimane [1] [51] Bolivia horticulture mixed wealth, land 250
17 Tsimane [2] [52] Bolivia horticulture mixed wealth 263
18 Himba [53] Namibia agropastoral polygyny cows, land 65
19 Kipsigis [6] Kenya agropastoral polygyny cows, land 626
20 Koore [54] Ethiopia agropastoral monogamy cows, land 82
21 Maasai [1] [47] Tanzania agropastoral polygyny cows, land 57
22 Maasai [2] [47] Tanzania agropastoral polygyny cows, land 133
23 Sangu [55] Tanzania agropastoral polygyny cows, land 59
24 Sidama [56] Ethiopia agropastoral polygyny cows, land 85
25 Sukuma [57] Tanzania agropastoral polygyny cows, land 60
26 Bangladeshi (2000s) [58] Bangladesh agriculture mixed land 1103
27 English (1800s) [59] England agriculture monogamy wealth 3851
28 Krummho¨rn (1700s) [60] Germany agriculture monogamy land 3106
29 Polish (1900s) [61] Poland agriculture monogamy cows, land 371
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
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variant of the polygyny threshold, accounting for both
rival and non-rival wealth and the relative importance of
each—is satisfied:
ggp(mp  c)m|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
fitness of singletonwife of a poorman
 ggr (mr  nc)mndm1|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
fitness as one of nwives of a richman:
ð1:2Þ
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) determine the fitness of males
and females. Without loss of generality, we can define mr,
mp and c in terms of units of mp, and likewise with gr and
gp, so that mr, for example, means the rival wealth of a
‘rich’ man relative to the rival wealth of a ‘poor’ man, and
analogously for non-rival wealth.
At any moment in time, there may be women seeking a
polygynous marriage and not finding a suitor, or the opposite,
men seeking but not finding additional wives. In the first
case—borrowing terms from economics—we say that ‘male
demand is limiting’ and in the second that ‘female supply is
limiting’. It is also possible for both male demand and
female supply to be jointly limiting, specifically in ‘market
clearing’ cases—defined as those cases where supply exactly
matches demand. Economic models of martial matching gen-
erally assume that the bride price, c, will adjust to either excess
supply (i.e. under which c will decrease) or excess demand
(under which c will increase), to generate this market clearing
equilibrium. Our model and our explanation for the decline
of polygyny with increasing inequality, however, apply
independently of whether or not the market clears.
From equation (1.1), we derive (see [17]) an analytic
expression for the equilibrium number of wives desired by
each rich man, n*:
n ¼ mr(1 m=d)
c
: ð1:3Þ
As one would expect, male demand for wives is larger when
(i) the rich class of males have greater average wealth than
the poor class of males (large mr), (ii) the mating cost is low
(small c), (iii) the importance of rival wealth as a determinant
of fitness realized through wives and their children is low
(small m) and (iv) diminishing fitness returns to additional
wives—for reasons independent of the need to share rival
wealth—are low (large d). Equation (1.3) yields the number
of wives that each rich man has if male demand is limiting,
or if the cost of bride price and mating investments, c, is
such that the market clears. However, if female supply is lim-
iting, and the market does not clear, then there is no simple
closed form solution for n*.
We distinguish between two different measures of poly-
gyny in a population—n*, the number of wives of each rich
man at equilibrium, and P, the percentage of wives with
co-wives at equilibrium. If at least some women marry
monogamously, and male demand is limiting, then there is
a closed form solution for P at equilibrium (see electronic
supplementary material), given by:
P ¼ s|{z}
sex
ratio
 u|{z}
fraction
of rich
males
 mr|{z}
wealth
ratio
 ð1 m=dÞ
c|fflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflffl}
conversion factor
:
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
n;wives per richman
ð1:4Þ
Note here that n* might be large even when P is small if there
are few rich men in the population. Historic Greek and
Roman marriage systems have been described in just this
way [69,70]. In these societies, up to two-thirds of the popu-
lation (including slaves) had almost no significant forms of
material wealth [15]—sharply limiting the ability of the
majority of the male population to marry polygynously.
From equation (1.4), we see that there are distinct effects
of the two components of the male wealth distribution—
(i) the frequency of rich males in the population, u and (ii)
the relative wealth of the rich and poor males, mr—on the
population-level frequency of wives with co-wives, P. The
final term (conversion factor) on the right of equation (1.4)
controls the extent to which a rich man’s elevated share
of rival wealth, mr is convertible into an elevated share of
wives. The extent to which wealth differentials can be trans-
formed into differentials in wife number will depend on the
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Figure 3. Relationship between the Gini coefficient on completed rival wealth and per cent completed female polygyny.
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importance of rival wealth in the fitness equation, m, the
extent of diminishing fitness returns to increasing number
of wives, d, and the mating investment costs, c.
2. Results
2.1. Theoretical results
We now demonstrate two theoretical results with the poten-
tial to resolve the polygyny paradox. First, diminishing
returns to additional wives arising from causes other than
necessity to share a husband’s rival material wealth will
reduce the number of wives acquired by each rich male.
Second, because of this fact, a highly unequal wealth distri-
bution with few extraordinarily rich men may produce little
polygyny, while a less unequal wealth distribution with a
larger fraction of rich men may produce a greater extent of
polygyny. Two rich men, for example, can be expected to
have more wives in total than one very rich man whose
wealth equals their combined wealth. For this same reason,
the Gini coefficient—see table 2 for a definition—is not a
sufficient statistic for the analysis of the relationship between
polygyny and wealth inequality. We take up each of these
results, in turn, before assessing if our empirical estimates
are consistent with this explanation.
2.1.1. Decreasing fitness returns to increasing number of wives
reduce how many wives are acquired by rich males
If we assume that male demand is limiting, then
equation (1.3) determines the number of wives each rich
man will have. It is clear from inspection of equation (1.3)
that a greater extent of diminishing fitness returns to
additional wives (i.e. a lower value of d) produces a lower
male demand for additional wives. This is demonstrated
mathematically in the electronic supplementary material.
Determining the effect of greater diminishing returns to
additional wives (i.e. a lower value of d) when female
supply is limiting is more challenging. As noted above, if
female supply is limiting, the value of n* implied by the poly-
gyny threshold inequality in equation (1.2) has no closed form
solution. To address this challenge, we proceed as follows.
Table 2. Definitions of variables and functions.
symbol domain definition
gp 1 A poor male’s non-rival wealth, like network ties or acquired knowledge. It may be passed in equal measure to all
offspring of a given father.
mp 1 A poor male’s rival wealth, like land. It must be divided among the offspring of a given father.
gr (1,1) A rich male’s non-rival wealth. This value is defined in terms of units of gp.
mr (1,1) A rich male’s rival wealth. This value is defined in terms of units of mp.
c (0, mp) The total mating investment (in units of the rival resource) devoted to acquiring a wife.
g (0, 1) The percentage increase in male fitness associated with a 1% increase in the male’s non-rival wealth per wife. We assume
that m þ g, 1.
m (0, 1) The percentage increase in male fitness associated with a 1% increase in the male’s rival wealth per wife. We assume that
m þ g, 1.
d (m, 1) The percentage increase in male fitness associated with a 1% increase in number of wives, holding constant total wealth
per wife; if d ¼ 1, then doubling the number of wives (with a co-occurring increase in wealth sufficient to let the
wealth per wife remain unchanged) will double male fitness. However, when d , 1, there are diminishing fitness
returns to additional wives, in addition to the fitness costs already associated with division of rival wealth across wives.
We assume that d . m to ensure that the elasticity of fitness with respect to the number of wives is positive.
u (0, 1) Frequency of rich males in a population. In the theoretical models, this is a defined parameter. In the empirical models, we
estimate this parameter using: (i) the frequency of men in the upper f percentile of cumulative wealth in each population
and (ii) the frequency of men with more than c wealth, where c is the empirical level of rival wealth that on average
separates men with two wives from men with a single wife. More details about these metrics are included in the
electronic supplementary material.
w (0,1) Male fitness. See equation (1.1).
n* (0,1) Number of wives per rich male at Nash equilibrium. See equation (1.3).
P (0, 1) Per cent female polygyny (as per cent of wives with co-wives) at Nash equilibrium. See equation (1.4).
s (0,1) Number of males per female in the population.
G (0, 1) Gini coefficient. A measure of wealth inequality varying from 0—no inequality—to 1—one person has all of the wealth.
In a population with two levels of wealth, low and high, with the high wealth group being u% of the population and
holding a fraction f% of all wealth, the Gini coefficient is f 2 u. In our case, this would imply that the Gini of the
wealth distribution is given by the function: G(u, mr) ¼ (umr/(umr þ (12 u)))2 u. In the case of a continuous
distribution of wealth, the Gini is expressible as half the relative mean absolute difference in wealth values [68].
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Suppose that the polygyny threshold in equation (1.2) were
satisfied by an equality. Then a reduction in d, holding all
other terms constant, would reduce the right-hand side of
the equation—the fitness of each of the n wives of a rich
man—while having no effect on the left-hand side—the fitness
of a singleton wife. Thus, holding all else equal, an offsetting
decrease in n would be required to restore the equality. This
is demonstrated in the electronic supplementary material by
differentiating equation (1.2) with respect to d.
This means that a man who was just barely rich enough
so that an unpaired woman would choose to marry him as
wife number (n þ 1) under the initial d, would, under the
lower d, be unable to secure the unpaired woman’s partner-
ship. As such, an increase in the extent of diminishing
returns to additional wives (lower d) will reduce both male
demand for, and female supply to, polygynous marriage.
Our results imply that if d, 1, a larger quantity of mod-
erately rich men can be expected to have more wives in total
than a smaller quantity of even richer men, holding constant
the total wealth held by the rich across these cases. This first
finding will interact with our second finding, discussed
below, concerning the effects of the population density of
the rich class of men on the frequency of polygyny and the
level of wealth inequality. In the electronic supplementary
material, we present an alternative approach to account for
diminishing marginal returns to increasing number of
wives and find that our insights do not depend on the specific
way in which diminishing fitness returns to increasing number
of wives are modelled.
2.1.2. Highly concentrated wealth inequality can reduce the
frequency of wives with co-wives
The structuring of rival wealth across men has implications
for both per cent female polygyny and the Gini coefficient
of rival wealth. In short, to analyse the relationship
between wealth inequality and per cent female polygyny,
we need more information than can be provided by the
Gini coefficient alone.
Consider the two Lorenz curves in figure 4a. The Gini
coefficient (0.19) and wealth ratio (mr/mp ¼ 6) for the two
distributions are identical, but wealth is distributed differently.
In the case of x, inequality arises from a large fraction of wealth
being held by a small class of very rich elite (u ¼ 0.05). In the
case of y, however, inequality arises from the presence of
a moderately sized class of relatively poor individuals (u ¼
0.76). Under the assumptions of our model, these wealth
distributions differ in a way that is critical to the fraction of
women that will be polygynously married.
To see the implications that each of the above wealth
distributions has for the extent of polygyny, we use the theor-
etical model given by equation (1.4). If we set s ¼ c ¼ mp ¼ 1,
m ¼ 0.4, and d ¼ 0.5, for example, and assume that male
demand is limiting, we can calculate the percentage of
wives with co-wives under each wealth distribution. Note
that this value of m is much greater than the mean of our
empirical estimates, 0.08, (90%CI: 0.05, 0.11). In this example,
rival wealth is of substantial importance for fitness and this is
expected to act as a major impediment to polygyny; but even
under these parameters, the wealth distribution in y is suffi-
cient to drive polygyny to fixation (p ¼ 1.00, all wives have
co-wives). By contrast, the wealth distribution in x generates
little polygyny (p ¼ 0.10) at the same levels of c, m and d. The
distribution with few rich men supports less polygyny than
the distribution with a greater number of rich men.
The same idea holds true in figure 4b, which illustrates a
more empirically plausible scenario; here the x distribution,
coloured red and representing a hypothetical agricultural
population, is characterized by a very large rich-to-poor
wealth ratio (mr/mp ¼ 35) and Gini coefficient (0.60), with
wealth still being concentrated by a small fraction of rich
elite (u ¼ 0.05). The y distribution, coloured blue and
representing a hypothetical horticultural population, is
characterized by a more modest rich-to-poor wealth ratio
cumulative population
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Figure 4. Lorenz curves of hypothetical wealth distributions. Points on the Lorenz curves represent statements like: ‘the bottom j% of all males have k% of the total
wealth.’ In both subfigures, the diagonal line p represents an equal distributional of wealth. In this case, the bottom j% of males have exactly j% of the wealth. As
inequality grows, the shaded area between the Lorenz curves (i.e. x or y) and the line of perfect equality, p, expands. This area, multiplied by 2, is equal to the Gini
coefficient. Details of the x and y wealth distributions, as well as details concerning the level of polygyny supported by each, are discussed in the main text.
(a) Lorenz curves with fixed Gini coefficients and wealth ratios, but differing per cent rich and (b) Lorenz curves with differing Gini coefficients, wealth ratios
and per cent rich.
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(mr/mp ¼ 5) and Gini coefficient (0.35), with wealth being
concentrated by a larger fraction of rich (u ¼ 0.45). If we
again set s ¼ c ¼ mp ¼ 1, m ¼ 0.4 and d ¼ 0.5, and assume
that male demand is limiting, we find that the wealth distri-
bution in y is sufficient to drive polygyny to higher levels
(p ¼ 0.45) than in x (p ¼ 0.35), even though wealth inequality
in x is much greater than in y.
To anticipate our empirical analysis: we find that agricul-
tural wealth distributions are more like x in the example from
figure 4b (large Gini, large wealth ratio and small per cent
rich), and horticultural wealth distributions are more like y
(moderate Gini, moderate wealth ratio and moderate per
cent rich). For agricultural-like wealth distributions with
diminishing fitness returns to increasing number of wives
(d, 1), large differences in relative wealth cannot compen-
sate for the smaller number of rich men in the production
of polygyny, because doubling a male’s wealth will not
double his expected number of wives.
Importantly, an increase in the population density of poor
individuals can have directionally opposite effects on the rival
wealth Gini and the extent of polygyny. For example, an
increase in the population density of poor individuals, (12 u),
from say a growing class of equally disadvantaged peasants,
can have the effect of decreasing per cent female polygyny, P,
while increasing inequality in the distribution of rival wealth
as measured by the Gini coefficient. The first point is apparent
simply from noticing that u (the frequency of rich males) is a
factor in the production of P in equation (1.4). The second
point can be demonstrated by showing that changing u does
not have a monotonic effect on wealth inequality. In particular,
for large mr (the rich-to-poor wealth ratio) decreasing u gener-
ally increases wealth inequality. We demonstrate this by
showing that the partial derivative of the Gini coefficient
(table 2) with respect to u is negative whenever:
u .
ffiffiffiffiffi
mr
p  1
mr  1 : ð2:1Þ
The above equation suggests that over a range of u, a small
decrease in u will lead to an increase in wealth inequality
as measured by the Gini coefficient. In fact, the right-hand
side of equation (2.1) goes to zero as mr!1. See the elec-
tronic supplementary material for mathematical details and
a visualization of the range of parameters sufficient to gener-
ate this effect. We also show in the electronic supplementary
material that the ratio of per cent female polygyny to the Gini
coefficient on rival wealth is monotonically decreasing as the
fraction of rich males declines.
A population can have a very large Gini coefficient for
rival wealth, but if that inequality is driven by the existence
of a large population of landless peasants, for example, it
will be structured in such a way that it produces lower popu-
lation levels of polygyny (as in figure 4b). The relationship
between wealth inequality and polygyny cannot be fully
understood by investigating cross-cultural variation in the
Gini of rival wealth. More finely resolved models are
needed to disentangle the countervailing effects of u and mr
on population-level marriage outcomes.
2.2. Empirical results
2.2.1. Predictions
If changes in the level of wealth inequality that accompanied
the transition from relatively egalitarian horticulture to
socially stratified agriculture were driven strongly by the
population growth of a large class of poor peasants—i.e.
decreasing u—and if there are diminishing fitness returns to
increasing number of wives beyond those entailed by the
sharing of the male’s rival wealth—i.e. d, 1—then we
would expect to see a decline in the frequency of polygyny
with the rise of agriculture.
Specifically, we predict:
(P1) Empirical estimates of equation (1.1) will show that d is
less than 1 in most human populations. This provides
evidence of diminishing fitness returns to additional
wives for reasons other than the sharing of the male’s
rival wealth.
(P2) Empirical estimates of u will be smaller in agricultural
economies than in other subsistence systems. This
provides evidence of a decreasing fraction of males
capable ofmeeting the polygyny threshold in agricultural
populations.
2.2.2. Estimates of fitness elasticities
To address prediction P1, we present empirical estimates of m
(the importance of rival wealth) and d (the extent of diminish-
ing return to increasing number of wives for reasons other than
rival wealth sharing) (figure 5). These values are estimated
using a multi-level regression model fit to our individual-
level data; methodological details are provided in the electronic
supplementary material. In all but four of the populations in
our sample, the estimated d coefficient is reliably less than
1. This result provides cross-cultural empirical support for the
first of the two conditions needed to generate a transition to
a greater degree of monogamy with increasing wealth inequal-
ity. Note two further results also shown in figure 5. First, our
estimates for m are quite low, particularly across the agricultural
economies. Second, our estimates of d2 m are positive in
almost all populations, including those that are concurrently
polygynous and those that are serially monogamous.
The consistently small values of m across all of our
samples, even the monogamous ones, was unexpected.
However, these low values reflect changes in male fitness
per wife. Because of biological limits to the rate of reproduction
in human females, significant increases to wealth are con-
strained to have less than proportional effects on fitness per
wife. The effects observed here are more likely to reflect the
ability of males with more than a threshold level of resources
per wife to minimize offspring mortality [71,72], rather than
to significantly enhance their own fertility. Though not
discussed in detail here, our data suggest that male wealth
impacts male fitness primarily by increasing the rate of wife
acquisition rather than by increasing reproductive success
per wife (see also, [73]).
Our second point addresses the possible concern that our
estimates of d may be low, in part, because we use times
married as our measure of polygyny. While it is true that
men can accumulate a greater maximal number of marriage
years through concurrent polygyny than serial monogamy,
figure 5a demonstrates that the use of times married is an
appropriate measure of polygyny for our purposes. Across
almost all populations, the elasticity of fitness with respect
to times married, d2 m, is positive and reliably non-zero.
Because these estimates measure the population-specific
effects of cumulative number of wives on reproductive
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success (see the exponent on n in equation (1.1)), they
demonstrate that an increased number of marriages leads to
increased reproductive success in both types of marriage
systems—concurrently polygynous and serially monogamous.
2.2.3. Estimates of per cent rich
We have established that there exists a strong cross-cultural
pattern of decreasing—but reliably non-zero—fitness returns
to increasing number of wives for reasons beyond rival
wealth sharing. We now turn our attention to testing if the
transition to agriculture is associated with a decreasing
fraction of wealthy males.
In our theoretical model, we assume a discrete two-class
wealth distribution, but empirical wealth data typically
have continuous distributions. To deal with this issue, we
consider two proxy measures for per cent rich in our empiri-
cal data: (i) the minimum percentage of men that account for
a fraction f of the total wealth and (ii) the frequency of men
with more than c wealth, where c is the empirical midpoint
in each population between the average wealth of males
with one wife and the average wealth of males with two
wives. More details about these metrics are included in the
electronic supplementary material. Table 3 provides popu-
lation-level posterior estimates of the completed wealth and
completed polygyny measures, with the mean estimates by
subsistence type shown in the bottom panel.
To address prediction P2, we calculate empirical estimates
of the fraction of rich men by production system (figure 6).
We find that agricultural populations have a significantly
reduced frequency of wealthy individuals relative to horticul-
tural populations. All four panels show reliable differences in
mean per cent rich between the horticultural and agricultural
subsistence modes. This lesser fraction of wealthy individuals
suggests a decreased number of men both able and willing to
take second wives. This in turn leads to reduced levels of per
cent female polygyny in contexts where large wealth differen-
tials are not able to underwrite large differentials in wives
due to the existence of diminishing fitness returns to such
additional wives.
A limitation of this last result is that it is based on data
from only four agricultural populations, three of them con-
centrated in a restricted region and time period (table 1).
Moreover, a more informative dataset would come not
from agricultural populations in the time period between
the 1700s and 2000s, but rather from the agricultural popu-
lations in which monogamy actually began to emerge de
novo. In our main analysis, we use estimates derived from
the individual-level records available in the populations
shown in table 1; in the electronic supplementary material,
we present comparable analyses that include 14 additional
wealth distributions from historical agricultural populations.
The results of this supplementary analysis are consistent with
our arguments here—and in fact show stronger and more
reliable effects in the direction predicted by P2. These
supplementary data, however, are based on sometimes con-
tested reconstructions of the historical wealth distributions
pieced together by archaeologists and economic historians;
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Figure 5. Empirical estimates of the elasticity of reproductive success on wives and rival wealth. The elasticity of fitness on wives is estimated using a parameter
representing the value: d2 m. We simply add our estimate of m to this value to yield an estimate of d. We find that d is typically much less than 1, but also
reliably non-zero. Note that posterior estimates of m and d 2 m (in red and blue) are paired by population ID along the x-axis; two populations—12 and 29—
have missing estimates of d 2 m and d because in these populations all males had only a single wife. See table 3 for population names. (a) Empirically estimated
fitness elasticities on rival wealth, m, and wives, d 2 m and (b) implied value of diminishing returns to increasing wife number for reasons unrelated to rival
wealth sharing, d; a lower value of d signifies greater diminishing returns.
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they must be appreciated within the constraints associated
with such forms of data.
2.2.4. Summary of empirical results
Using individual-level data from 29 populations, we show
evidence of a general cross-cultural pattern of decreasing
marginal fitness returns to increasing number of marriages.
Further, using these same 29 datasets (reinforced in the elec-
tronic supplementary material with 14 additional wealth
distributions from historical agricultural populations), we
demonstrate the existence of an increasingly skewed dis-
tribution of material wealth in class-based agricultural
societies (i.e. more of the wealth is concentrated in a smaller,
Table 3. Posterior wealth and polygyny estimates. Values are medians and 90% credibile intervals. The estimates of proportion rich and wealth ratio presented
here are calculated using the minimum frequency of men that own 50% of the population’s total wealth, after adjusting for age. Our age-adjustment
methodology is detailed in the electronic supplementary material. Estimates of polygyny (as per cent of wives with co-wives) are also adjusted for age. The
final variable polygyny-60 is a calculation of the empirically observed frequency of wives with co-wives among men age 60 or above. Our use of the term co-
wives refers to the frequency of women married to a man who has married or will marry more than once. To calculate these values, however, we are limited
to using only a small subset of the data in each population taken from men age 60 and above. This variable serves as a check on our age-adjustment
methodology; we observe a strong positive correlation between the completed polygyny estimates and the observed completed polygyny data, r ¼ 0.93. The
bottom block of estimates are means by subsistence type.
ID population subsistence wealth Gini wealth ratio proportion rich polygyny polygyny-60
1 Ache´ forager 0.19 (0.18, 0.24) 1.7 (1.6, 2.0) 0.37 (0.33, 0.38) 0.66 (0.55, 0.74) 0.8
2 Agta forager 0.24 (0.24, 0.27) 1.9 (1.9, 2.1) 0.33 (0.31, 0.34) 0.34 (0.27, 0.42) 0.3
3 Aka forager 0.18 (0.17, 0.24) 1.7 (1.6, 1.9) 0.37 (0.34, 0.38) 0.88 (0.81, 0.93) 0.75
4 Dolgan/Niaa forager 0.47 (0.46, 0.50) 5.2 (4.6, 6.1) 0.16 (0.14, 0.18) 0.38 (0.26, 0.48) 0.11
5 Hadza forager 0.20 (0.20, 0.26) 1.7 (1.7, 2.0) 0.36 (0.32, 0.36) 0.67 (0.56, 0.76) 0.68
6 Kung forager 0.22 (0.21, 0.26) 1.8 (1.8, 2.1) 0.35 (0.32, 0.36) 0.33 (0.08, 0.56) 0.18
7 Lamalera forager 0.34 (0.32, 0.37) 2.8 (2.6, 3.0) 0.26 (0.24, 0.28) 0.19 (0.10, 0.29) 0.14
8 Pume´ forager 0.21 (0.20, 0.28) 1.8 (1.7, 2.2) 0.35 (0.30, 0.37) 0.79 (0.70, 0.88) 0.5
9 Chagga horticultural 0.25 (0.24, 0.37) 2.0 (1.9, 3.0) 0.33 (0.24, 0.33) 0.32 (0.18, 0.48) 0.17
10 Makushi horticultural 0.33 (0.24, 0.40) 2.6 (2.0, 3.2) 0.28 (0.23, 0.33) 0.82 (0.68, 0.92) –
11 Matsigenka horticultural 0.40 (0.34, 0.52) 3.7 (2.5, 5.2) 0.19 (0.14, 0.27) 0.85 (0.71, 0.94) 1
12 Maya [1] horticultural 0.38 (0.27, 0.46) 3.3 (2.2, 4.7) 0.23 (0.15, 0.31) 0.39 (0.00, 0.73) –
13 Maya [2] horticultural 0.22 (0.21, 0.23) 1.9 (1.8, 2.0) 0.34 (0.32, 0.35) 0.26 (0.07, 0.46) 0.11
14 Mayangna horticultural 0.51 (0.39, 0.59) 5.6 (3.2, 8.3) 0.15 (0.11, 0.23) 0.91 (0.82, 0.96) 0.93
15 Pimbwe horticultural 0.33 (0.27, 0.47) 2.7 (2.1, 4.7) 0.27 (0.17, 0.32) 0.70 (0.65, 0.76) 0.69
16 Tsimane [1] horticultural 0.26 (0.24, 0.29) 2.1 (2.0, 2.3) 0.32 (0.30, 0.33) 0.58 (0.46, 0.69) 0.56
17 Tsimane [2] horticultural 0.31 (0.28, 0.36) 2.4 (2.2, 2.8) 0.29 (0.26, 0.31) 0.50 (0.38, 0.61) 0.55
18 Himba agropastoral 0.65 (0.52, 0.71) 9.6 (4.6, 13.9) 0.09 (0.06, 0.17) 0.98 (0.96, 0.99) 0.96
19 Kipsigis agropastoral 0.45 (0.43, 0.47) 4.0 (3.7, 4.3) 0.20 (0.19, 0.21) 0.83 (0.80, 0.86) 0.89
20 Koore agropastoral 0.35 (0.32, 0.39) 2.9 (2.5, 3.4) 0.26 (0.22, 0.28) 0.64 (0.46, 0.79) 0.25
21 Maasai [1] agropastoral 0.61 (0.55, 0.66) 8.0 (6.0, 11.3) 0.11 (0.07, 0.14) 0.92 (0.86, 0.96) 0.94
22 Maasai [2] agropastoral 0.55 (0.51, 0.61) 6.4 (5.5, 8.2) 0.14 (0.11, 0.15) 0.98 (0.96, 0.99) 0.99
23 Sangu agropastoral 0.44 (0.38, 0.58) 4.2 (3.2, 10.0) 0.19 (0.08, 0.24) 0.82 (0.72, 0.89) 0.67
24 Sidama agropastoral 0.26 (0.24, 0.31) 2.2 (2.0, 2.5) 0.31 (0.28, 0.33) 0.69 (0.54, 0.82) 0.6
25 Sukuma agropastoral 0.41 (0.37, 0.46) 3.3 (2.9, 3.9) 0.22 (0.20, 0.25) 0.88 (0.82, 0.92) 0.86
26 Bangladesh agricultural 0.69 (0.59, 0.72) 10.3 (6.1, 12.1) 0.09 (0.08, 0.14) 0.29 (0.25, 0.34) 0.28
27 English agricultural 0.86 (0.79, 0.89) 37.3 (15.1, 47.3) 0.03 (0.02, 0.06) 0.29 (0.28, 0.32) 0.25
28 Krummho¨rn agricultural 0.77 (0.71, 0.79) 11.9 (9.0, 12.6) 0.08 (0.07, 0.10) 0.44 (0.42, 0.46) 0.43
29 Polish agricultural 0.37 (0.37, 0.42) 3.0 (3.0, 3.3) 0.25 (0.23, 0.25) 0.01 (0.00, 0.04) 0
forager 0.26 (0.25, 0.28) 2.4 (2.2, 2.5) 0.32 (0.30, 0.32) 0.53 (0.48, 0.57) 0.40
horticultural 0.34 (0.31, 0.36) 3.0 (2.6, 3.5) 0.26 (0.24, 0.28) 0.59 (0.53, 0.65) 0.56
agropastoral 0.47 (0.44, 0.49) 5.2 (4.4, 6.1) 0.19 (0.17, 0.20) 0.84 (0.81, 0.87) 0.88
agricultural 0.67 (0.64, 0.69) 15.4 (10.0, 18.4) 0.11 (0.10, 0.13) 0.26 (0.25, 0.27) 0.27
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elite fraction of the population). Both of these empirical find-
ings are consistent with our model-based explanation for the
decline of polygyny in societies engaged in agricultural
production.
3. Discussion
We use cross-cultural data and a new mutual mate choice
model to propose a resolution to the polygyny paradox. Fol-
lowing Oh et al. [17], we extend the standard polygyny
threshold model to a mutual mate choice model that accounts
for both female supply to, and male demand for, polygynous
matchings, in the light of the importance of, and inequality
in, rival and non-rival forms of wealth. The empirical results
presented in figures 5 and 6 demonstrate two phenomena
that are jointly sufficient to generate a transition to more fre-
quent monogamy among populations with a co-occurring
transition to a more unequal, highly stratified, class-based
social structure. In such populations, fewer men can cross
the wealth threshold required to obtain a second wife, and
those who do may be fabulously wealthy, but—because of
diminishing marginal fitness returns to increasing number
of marriages—do not acquire wives in full proportion to
their capacity to support them with rival wealth. Together,
these effects reduce the population-level fraction of wives in
polygynous marriages.
Our model demonstrates that a low population-level
frequency of polygyny will be an equilibrium outcome
among fitness maximizing males and females in a society
characterized by a large class of wealth-poor peasants and a
small class of exceptionally wealthy elite. Our mutual mate
choice model thus provides an empirically plausible re-
solution to the polygyny paradox and the transition to
monogamy which co-occurred with the rise of highly unequal
agricultural populations.
We, however, cannot yet explain the causes of the unex-
pectedly substantial decreasing marginal fitness returns to
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mean difference between focal
subsistence type and agriculture:
forager: 0.13 (0.07, 0.19)
horticultural: 0.09 (0.03, 0.15)
agropastoral: 0.04 (–0.03, 0.1)
agricultural
mean difference between focal
subsistence type and agriculture:
forager: 0.2 (0.1, 0.31)
horticultural: 0.15 (0.05, 0.26)
agropastoral: 0.07 (–0.03, 0.18)
agricultural
mean difference between focal
subsistence type and agriculture:
forager: 0.28 (0.12, 0.44)
horticultural: 0.22 (0.06, 0.38)
agropastoral: 0.13 (–0.03, 0.29)
agricultural
mean difference between focal
subsistence type and agriculture:
forager: 0.2 (0.15, 0.26)
horticultural: 0.22 (0.16, 0.28)
agropastoral: 0.17 (0.09, 0.24)
agricultural
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6. Frequency of rich males. Frames (a), (b) and (c) illustrate the minimal fraction of men who possess the upper f fraction of cumulative wealth in the
population. We see that wealth in agricultural populations is disproportionately possessed by a significantly smaller fraction of the population than in horticultural or
even agropastoral societies. In frame (d ), we calculate the empirical fraction of men with sufficient wealth to take on multiple wives, assuming the 2-polygyny
threshold to rest halfway between the average wealth for men with one wife and the average wealth of men with two wives. Our sample size is reduced by two
populations—12 and 29—in frame (d ) because in these populations all males had only a single wife. Values listed in the legends show the mean difference (and
90% confidence intervals from a t-test) in the frequency of rich males between the focal subsistence type and agricultural populations. For example, in frame (a) the
estimate of the mean frequency of rich males in horticultural populations was 0.09 (90%CI: 0.03, 0.15) higher than the corresponding mean estimate in agricultural
populations. Per cent of men with (a) greater than or equal to 0.33 of total wealth, (b) greater than or equal to 0.50 of total wealth, (c) greater than or equal to
0.66 of total wealth and (d ) greater than or equal to empirical 2-polygyny threshold.
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increasing number of marriages. A purely statistical expla-
nation of our results could be that we have missed some
important rival form of wealth, which if accounted for
would result in a larger estimate form andhence a reduced esti-
mate of the degree of diminishing returns to additional wives
for reasons other than the sharing of rival wealth. Another
possibility, already mentioned, is that in some of our datasets
the very wealthy could be deliberately limiting their reproduc-
tive success (i.e. passing through the demographic transition),
which would also drive m downwards.
In addition to these possible statistical effects, there are a
number of other plausible causes of the diminishing returns
to additional wives observed in our populations. One possi-
bility is that a male’s time and attention are rival inputs to
his own fitness. This situation is likely to arise when paternal
investment is essential to offspring survival and well-being.
A male’s time can also be rival in other fitness relevant
ways. For example, it may be difficult for a single wealthy
man to effectively mate guard a large number of wives.
With a wealth ratio of mr ¼ 2 and a per cent rich of u ¼ 0.5,
a single rich man will have to monopolize his two wives in
the face of challenges from a single unmarried man on aver-
age; however, with a wealth ratio of mr ¼ 10 and a per cent
rich of u ¼ 0.1, a single rich man will have to defend his 10
wives from nine unmarried men on average. As the wealth
ratio grows even more skewed, this situation could become
increasingly difficult to manage (e.g. requiring the use of
eunochs to defend harems [74]).
A related possibility is that a growing number of unmar-
ried men could socially censure wealthy polygynous males,
imposing costs on them that reduce male demand for and/or
female supply to polygynous marriage [23,24].
A third possibility is that sexually transmitted infection
(STI) burden [22,75] could diminish returns to polygyny, if
polygyny enhances infection rates [76,77]. Imagine that an
STI which leads to infertility occurs in the female population
with probability k. Then, an uninfected man and his wives
can avoid infertility if and only if none of his wives have the
infection. This occurs with probability: (12 k)n. If we assume
an empirically plausible rate for this STI, like 0.07 (which is
lower than the contemporary prevalence of curable STIs in
Western Europe [78]), then a monogamous man would be
paired with fertile woman 0.93 of the time, and a man in
2-polygyny would be paired with fertile women 0.86 of the
time. An ultra-wealthy man in 10-polygyny, however, would
be more likely than not (0.52) to have infertile wives—a
prospect that could lead to diminishing fitness returns to,
and hence, demand for, additional wives. A similar argument
holds even if marriage is considered sequentially—as in serial
monogamy—though the effect would be smaller.
Finally, impediments to cooperation or even outright
conflict among co-wives can be greater as the number of
wives increases. Interference competition among co-wives
could impose significant fitness costs in settings where effec-
tive child rearing benefits from cooperation [79,80]. It could
well be that incumbent wives resist incorporation of
additional wives to the wealth sharing pool, perhaps with
greater effectiveness as their numbers grow.
Empirically exploring these and other possible expla-
nations for the unexpectedly substantial diminishing fitness
returns to additional wives that are not explainable by the
division of rival wealth among wives would be a valuable
next step, but one that would take us beyond the formal
modelling, database and comparative statistical methods
that we have presented.
4. Conclusion
Building on the original polygyny threshold model [1,2],
we have proposed—and provided some empirical support
for—a new explanation for the decline of polygyny in highly
stratified societies where rival wealth is concentrated by a
small class of rich elite. To increase the scope and explanatory
power of the original model, we have generalized it to include
(i) mutual mate choice dynamics [28] and (ii) a consideration
of both the level and structuring of wealth inequality. The
two wealth types in our model are the end points on a conti-
nuum from rival to non-rival and we omit variability in the
quality of females. Further, our demonstration is limited to a
two-class wealth system.
To test our model, we have used individual-level data on
wealth, marriage and fitness taken from 29 human populations.
This allows us to estimate effects that cannot be calculated from
population-level summaries in the Standard Cross-Cultural
Sample or related databases. Across the majority of these
populations we find strong evidence of (i) diminishing fitness
returns to additional wives beyond those which occur due to
the rival nature of wealth that is shared among wives, as
well as (ii) a lesser fraction of wealthy men in highly unequal
agricultural production systems. These data provide initial sup-
port for our proposed resolution of the polygyny paradox, and
point to the benefits of integrating formal models of the
relationship between inequality and mating system evolution
with cross-cultural, individual-level databases.
More generally, we show that amutual mate choice analysis
of the fitness consequences of individualmatingdecisions offers
a lens throughwhichwe can study the coevolutionary processes
contributing to the transformation of marriage system norms.
Some previous studies have addressed how social norms for
monogamy might have plausibly spread post-emergence.
Our findings provide an explanation for how monogamy can
emerge de novo, even among fitness maximizing agents in
highly unequal social contexts.
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offspring of a given father. What economists term public goods are
non-rival in this sense. Biologists writing about the same phenomena
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classify the forms of parental investments in offspring.
2An elasticity is defined as the ratio of the percentage change in one
variable to the percentage change in another—it is a unitless measure
of the relationship between variables. In empirical work, if both
dependent and independent variables are measured in natural logs,
then the estimated regression coefficients from a linear model will
be interpretable as elasticities.
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